Indus Water Treaty Suspended

Why in News? India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan, as announced on April 23, 2025, following a terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 26 people. The decision was made by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in response to “cross-border linkages” to the attack, marking a significant escalation in India-Pakistan relations.

Meaning of Suspension: India has declared the IWT “in abeyance” with immediate effect, meaning it is temporarily halting cooperation under the treaty until Pakistan “credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.” This involves:

• Freezing treaty mechanisms: Stopping technical meetings, data sharing on water flows, and notifications about projects.
• Removing restrictions: India is no longer bound by treaty limits on the western rivers, potentially allowing new storage projects, reservoir flushing (e.g., Kishanganga project), or altering water flows.
• Not a formal withdrawal: The treaty lacks an exit clause, so suspension is a temporary measure rather than a legal termination, which would require mutual consent or significant international legal action.

However, immediate impacts are limited because India currently lacks the infrastructure to drastically alter water flows or store large volumes from the western rivers.

Impacts of the Suspension on Pakistan:

The suspension has profound implications, particularly for Pakistan, given its heavy dependence on the Indus system.

Impacts on Pakistan

Pakistan is highly vulnerable due to its reliance on the Indus system for agriculture, water supply, and energy. The potential impacts include:

Agricultural Disruption:

• ~80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land (16 million hectares) depends on the Indus system for irrigation, supporting crops like wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton.
• The agricultural sector contributes ~23% to Pakistan’s GDP and supports 68% of rural livelihoods. Any reduction in water flow could lead to lower crop yields, food shortages, and economic instability.
• Pakistan’s water storage capacity is low (Mangla and Tarbela dams hold only 4 MAF, ~10% of its annual share), making it sensitive to flow disruptions.

Water Scarcity:

• Major cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Multan rely on the Indus system for drinking water. Reduced flows could exacerbate Pakistan’s existing water stress, one of the highest globally.
• Per capita water availability is already declining rapidly, and disruptions could trigger urban water crises.

Energy Security:

• Hydropower plants like Tarbela and Mangla depend on consistent river flows. Disruptions could stall power generation, affecting industries and households.

Economic and Social Fallout:

• Reduced agricultural output could lead to loan defaults, unemployment, and rural migration.
• Domestic unrest is likely, especially in Punjab and Sindh, where water scarcity could fuel political pressure on Pakistan’s leadership.

Long-Term Risks:

• If India builds new storage or diversion infrastructure (which would take years), it could permanently reduce Pakistan’s water share, posing existential threats to its economy and food security.

Options before Pakistan:

• Pakistan faces a challenging situation with limited immediate options due to its downstream position and dependence on the Indus system. Its potential responses include:

Diplomatic and Legal Options:

• World Bank Mediation: As the treaty’s guarantor, the World Bank could be approached to mediate. Pakistan may argue that India’s suspension violates the treaty’s spirit and seek reinstatement of cooperation. However, India’s stance—that terrorism voids peacetime agreements—may weaken Pakistan’s case.
• International Arbitration: The IWT’s Article IX allows disputes to escalate to neutral experts or arbitration. However, India’s suspension pauses these mechanisms, and experts suggest arbitration may be ineffective if India refuses to comply.
• UN or ICJ: Pakistan could raise the issue at the United Nations or International Court of Justice, framing India’s move as a threat to regional stability. However, such processes are slow, and India’s national security justification may limit international support.
• Engage Allies: Pakistan could seek support from allies like China, which has stakes in the Indus (via Tibet) and influence in Pakistan’s CPEC projects. China’s response could escalate tensions but also risks involving India in upstream disputes.
• De-escalation: Pakistan could offer verifiable steps to address India’s concerns about terrorism (e.g., cracking down on groups like The Resistance Front, linked to the Pahalgam attack). This could prompt India to resume treaty cooperation, but domestic political constraints in Pakistan make this difficult.

 Key Provisions of IWT :

• The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed on September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan, with the World Bank as a facilitator, is a water-sharing agreement governing the use of the Indus River system. It allocates the use of six rivers—Indus, Jhelum, Chenab (western rivers) and Ravi, Beas, Sutlej (eastern rivers)—and establishes cooperative mechanisms.

Allocation of Rivers:

Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej):

• Allocated to India for unrestricted use, including consumptive uses like irrigation, storage, and hydropower, after a transition period (1960–1970) during which India contributed to Pakistan’s replacement works (e.g., link canals).
• Pakistan was weaned off dependence on these rivers, receiving ~20% of the system’s water (33 million acre-feet, MAF).

Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab):

• Allocated primarily to Pakistan, which receives ~80% of the system’s water (135 MAF).
• India is allowed limited non-consumptive uses, such as:
  • Domestic use (e.g., drinking water).
  • Agricultural use (limited irrigation, specified in Annexure C).
  • Hydropower generation (run-of-river projects, subject to design restrictions in Annexure D).
  • Limited storage (up to 6 MAF, per Annexure E).

Restrictions on India’s Use of Western Rivers:

• India cannot build storage dams on the western rivers beyond the treaty’s specified limits (e.g., 1.25 MAF for general storage, 1.6 MAF for flood control, 0.75 MAF for power).
• Run-of-river hydropower projects (e.g., Kishanganga, Baglihar) must adhere to strict design and operation criteria to avoid obstructing or diverting water flows to Pakistan.
• India must notify Pakistan of planned projects and share technical details to ensure compliance.

 Data Sharing and Transparency:

• Both countries are required to exchange data on river flows, withdrawals, and project operations.
• India must provide Pakistan with advance notice of projects on western rivers, including design plans, to allow scrutiny and objections if the projects violate treaty terms.
• Regular inspections of project sites are permitted to ensure compliance.

Permanent Indus Commission (PIC):

• Establishes a bilateral commission with one commissioner from each country to:

• Facilitate communication, data exchange, and technical discussions.
• Resolve disputes through dialogue and inspections.
• Meet at least annually to review treaty implementation.

• The PIC is the first step in addressing any “questions” or “differences” arising under the treaty.

Dispute Resolution Mechanism:

• Three-tier process for resolving issues:
  1. PIC Resolution: Commissioners attempt to resolve questions bilaterally.
  2. Neutral Expert: If the PIC fails, a “difference” can be referred to a neutral expert (appointed by the World Bank or mutually agreed parties) for technical disputes (e.g., Baglihar dam dispute in 2005).
  3. Court of Arbitration: For unresolved “disputes” (broader legal or interpretive issues), a seven-member arbitral tribunal can be formed (e.g., Kishanganga dispute in 2010).
• The World Bank plays a facilitating role but is not a party to the treaty.

6. Cooperation and Future Projects:

• Both countries are encouraged to cooperate on optimal use of the Indus system, including joint projects for flood control, drainage, or research (though such cooperation has been rare).
• Pakistan can request India to adjust water releases for flood management or other needs, subject to mutual agreement.

7. Financial Provisions:

• India provided a fixed contribution of £62.06 million (in 1960 terms) to Pakistan during the transition period to fund replacement infrastructure (e.g., Tarbela and Mangla dams, link canals) to offset the loss of eastern river water.
• The treaty does not require ongoing financial obligations beyond this.

8. No Exit Clause:

• The treaty is designed to be permanent and lacks a unilateral withdrawal mechanism.
• Amendments or termination require mutual consent, making the treaty legally binding unless both parties agree otherwise.

9. Force Majeure and Exceptions:

• The treaty implicitly allows flexibility for extraordinary circumstances (e.g., war, natural disasters), but it does not explicitly address suspension or abrogation.
• India’s 2025 suspension is justified as a response to terrorism, though the treaty does not provide for such unilateral pauses.

10. World Bank’s Role:

• The World Bank is a signatory to specific financial and mediation clauses but not the treaty itself.
• It acts as a guarantor, facilitating dispute resolution (e.g., appointing neutral experts) and holding funds during the transition period.
• The Bank can mediate but cannot enforce compliance.